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Labor Law-POLICE OFFICER MAY NOT PROPERLY BE DISMISSED FOR RE-
FUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION-Farmer v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1983)
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
Oliver Wendell Holmes1
"We conclude that policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not
relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights."
William 0. Douglas2
I. INTRODUCTION
As indicated by the above quotations, police officers, as well as
other public employees, have come a long way towards attaining
first-class citizenship in the courts. In a recent decision, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court has taken a strong position that demonstrates
this progress. In Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale,3 the court, in
a five-two decision, held that police officers could not properly be
discharged for refusing to submit to a polygraph test." The deci-
sion relied primarily on the inherent unreliability of the polygraph
instrument and its lack of judicial acceptance. The holding is par-
ticularly significant because it drastically alters the current state of
the law in Florida and places Florida among only a handful of ju-
risdictions that have adopted this position.
Although the Farmer decision represents progressive judicial
reasoning, the limited issues presented to the court prevent this
holding from providing a panacea on the issue of polygraphs in the
employment scenario. The many issues left unresolved by Farmer
and, in fact, the Farmer holding itself, are conducive to legislative
study culminating in a comprehensive statute. Often sparked by
judicial decisions, the legislatures in twenty-one states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have seen the need for such legislation.'
1. McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. .517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
2. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
3. 427 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1983).
4. Id. at 190.
5. The minority rule is also followed by California, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Oregon and Washington. Each of these states adopted the rule by statutory provi-
sion. The majority rule is that police officers may be required to take polygraph examina-
tions. Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island have adopted this rule by
statute, and Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, New York and Texas have done so by case
decision.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1964); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982)
and CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 3307 (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51(g) (West 1958 &
Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-801 to -803 (1973);
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This note will discuss the Farmer decision and its impact on
Florida law. Further, it will explore issues beyond the scope of the
Farmer holding that are sure to arise later. Since most of these
issues can be resolved by comprehensive legislation, they will be
discussed with that goal in mind. This discussion will include an
analysis of judicial decisions and statutes from other jurisdictions
in an attempt to provide an objective overview of the issues that
should be considered in formulating remedial legislation.
II. Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale
Arthur Farmer was employed as a police sergeant for the City of
Fort Lauderdale Police Department. On April 28, 1977, Farmer
was working a special duty at the Southeast Bank of Broward.
During the day's activities, he was asked by a teller to assist her by
moving a heavy "bus vault" from the main vault to the teller's win-
dow. 7 Later that day the teller reported that $10,000 was missing
from the vault that Farmer had previously moved.8
The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation
into the disappearance. All bank employees who had access to the
vault were subjected to polygraph examinations and, purportedly,
were eliminated as suspects. Farmer, however, refused to submit to
a polygraph at the initial stage of the investigation.'
By March of 1978, the FBI had exhausted all investigatory ave-
nues in the case. The matter was subsequently turned over to the
Fort Lauderdale Police Department, 0 and the investigation was
continued by the internal affairs unit of that Department." In or-
der to facilitate Farmer's cooperation, members of the offices of the
State Attorney and the United States Attorney gave their written
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-21 to -22 (1968); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903 to -904 (1973); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7166 (Supp. 1982-83); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1979); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West 1973 & Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.201-.209
(West Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.75-.77 (West 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-119
to -120 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1737 (1943); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40A-1 (West
1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 733-35 (McKinney 1978) (prohibits voice stress tests but not
polygraphs); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.225 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7321 (Purdon 1973);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.1-1 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-37-16 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.44.120 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.37 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1982).
7. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Unlike a criminal investigation unit, the internal affairs unit investigates employees
to determine whether discipline is warranted.
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agreement not to use any statements made by Farmer to the inter-
nal investigators against him in any subsequent criminal
proceeding.12
On June 6, 1978, Farmer, with counsel present, was presented
with the letters of immunity and was ordered by police superiors
to answer questions. After he answered all of the questions, he was
next ordered to submit to a polygraph test. On advice of counsel,
Farmer responded: "not at this time." He gave a similar response
to a subsequent demand by another superior. 13 Prior to this de-
mand, Farmer had been advised that a refusal to comply might
"subject [him] to disciplinary action up to and including
dismissal. '14
On June 29, 1978, Farmer was suspended and subsequently dis-
missed for insubordination. 5 The order of dismissal was affirmed
by the Civil Service Board of the City of Fort Lauderdale and the
Circuit Court, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit.' 6 The Fourth District
Court of Appeals, finding no distinction between the instant case
and its previous decision in State Department of Highway Safety
& Motor Vehicles v. Zimmer,17 denied certiorari, with Judge Hur-
ley in dissent. 8
The Florida Supreme Court obtained jurisdiction under article
V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution to answer three ques-
12. Brief for Petitioner at 5.
The letter from the office of the U.S. Attorney dated May 16, 1978, stated:
In order to secure his cooperation in taking a polygraph examination, please be
advised that anything said by Officer Farmer during that examination ...will
not be used by this office against him in any criminal prosecution.
Id. at 13-14.
The letter dated May 19, 1978 from the Chief Assistant State Attorney said:
To assist your department in your internal investigation concerning this matter
....... [sic] this office agrees and by this letter binds itself to this agreement,
that anything Sgt. Farmer may say to any officer of the Fort Lauderdale Police
Department ....... [sic] will be considered confidential and not admissible as
evidence, should any criminal prosecution ........ [sic] be instituted in the
future.
Id. at 13-14.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Brief for Respondent at 3 (quoting Record at 36).
15. The written order stated the reason for dismissal as follows: "Willful violation of a
lawful and reasonable regulation, order or direction, made or given by a superior officer
where such violation has amounted to insubordinate or serious breach of proper discipline
or has resulted in loss or injury to the public." Brief for Petitioner at 5-6.
16. Farmer, 427 So. 2d at 188.
17. 398 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
18. Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 400 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
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tions certified by the Fourth District as being of great public
importance:
1) Does Section 914.04 of the Florida Statutes and the Su-
preme Court's decision in Lurie v. Florida State Board of Den-
tistry ... prohibit the use of immunized testimony to discharge a
city employee?
2) Should a city employee's right under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and
Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Florida
require protection by immunization from all penal sanctions as
opposed to only criminal?
3) Can a police officer be compelled to submit to a polygraph
test when he is a suspect in a criminal investigation without
granting him immunity from all penalties or forfeiture?19
Although the questions, as drafted, were not relevant to the cru-
cial issues in the case,1° the court, in a pervasive opinion by Justice
Adkins, reversed the decision of the lower court.2"
The supreme court began its analysis by discussing the United
States Supreme Court decisions dealing with the issue of question-
ing public employees. In Garrity v. New Jersey,22 the appellants,
who were police officers, were under investigation for "fixing" traf-
fic tickets. The Attorney General advised the officers, before ques-
tioning them, that they were entitled to refuse to answer the ques-
tions by invoking their fifth amendment privilege against self-
19. Farmer, 427 So. 2d at 187.
20. The certified questions all pertained to the previous Florida immunity statute. That
statute required persons who had been subpoenaed to testify before any court with felony
trial jurisdiction, grand juries, or state attorneys. However, it immunized the person from
any "penalty or forfeiture" on "account of any transaction, matter, or thing" which con-
cerned the testimony. FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1981). The Florida Supreme Court, in Lurie v.
Florida State Rd. of Dentistry, 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1973), interpreted the "penalty or forfei-
ture" language as contemplating "loss of property, position or some other personal right."
Id. at 226. Hence, as interpreted, the immunity statute prevented the state from administra-
tively punishing Lurie for the matter about which he had been subpoenaed to testify.
As the Farmer court pointed out, however, since Farmer had not been subpoenaed to
testify before one of the entities enumerated in the statute, he could not avail himself of the
immunity statute's broad judicial gloss.
Under the amended version of FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (Supp. 1982), the immunized testimony
may not be used against the testifying individual in any subsequent "criminal investigation
or proceeding." Hence, the immunity statute, as amended, is much narrower in scope then
its predecessor, and it appears that such immunized testimony could now be used in an
administrative hearing as evidence to support a dismissal from employment.
21. Farmer, 427 So. 2d at 192.
22. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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incrimination. The officers were told, however, that the penalty for
so doing was the forfeiture of their jobs under a New Jersey stat-
ute.2" Faced with this Hobson's Choice, the officers answered the
questions, and the resulting answers were used as evidence against
them in a subsequent criminal prosecution."'
The Court held that the threat of job forfeiture was "coercion"
within the contemplation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
and, therefore, the answers could not be used as evidence against
the officers in a subsequent criminal proceeding.2 5 However, the
Court did not address the issue of whether a police officer may be
discharged for refusing to answer questions, when the answers are
intended to be used for the limited purpose of assessing his suita-
bility to continue in his employment.
In Spevack v. Klein,28 a companion case to Garrity, the Supreme
Court held that an attorney could not be disbarred merely for as-
serting his fifth amendment privilege. The Court stated that the
lawyer there, like the police officers in Garrity, enjoyed "first-class
citizenship. ' '27 In a concurring opinion, Justice Fortas was careful
to expressly limit the Spevack holding to lawyers and did not ex-
tend it to public employees who are asked questions "specifically,
directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of [their] official
duties." 8
In Gardner v. Broderick,2 9 a New York City police officer was
discharged for refusing to waive statutory immunity while testify-
ing before a grand jury that was investigating corruption. The of-
ficer purportedly was required to waive immunity under a provi-
23. The statute required public employees or office holders to testify before any official
body or, if the employee refused to testify, invoked his fifth amendment privilege, or refused
to waive immunity, he would be removed from office. Id. at 494 n.1 (quoting N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965)).
24. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495.
25. Id. at 500.
26. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
27. Id. at 516.
28. Id. at 519 (Fortas, J., concurring).
Justice Fortas' basis for this distinction was as follows:
[A] lawyer is not an employee of the State. He does not have the responsibility of
an employee to account to the State for his actions because he does not perform
them as agent of the State. His responsibility to the State is to obey its laws and
the rules of conduct that it has generally laid down as part of its licensing proce-
dures. The special responsibilities that he assumes as licensee of the State and
officer of the court do not carry with them a diminution, however limited, of his
Fifth Amendment rights.
Id. at 520.
29. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
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sion of the State Constitution and City Charter. In an opinion by
Justice Fortas, the Court held that the police officer could not be
discharged for refusing to waive his fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.30 In dicta, the Court recognized the lawyer/pub-
lic employee distinction made by Justice Fortas in his Spevack
concurrence.3 1 The Court articulated that a police officer's right to
remain silent, unlike that of a lawyer, is not absolute:
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifi-
cally, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his of-
ficial duties, without being required to waive his immunity with
respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal
prosecution of himself, . . . the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion would not have been a bar to his dismissal.32
The Court would, therefore, require police officers to answer ques-
tions when the answers are to be used "solely for the purpose of
securing an accounting of his performance of his public trust."3 3 In
Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner of Sani-
tation,34 the Court made clear that its holding in Gardner was also
applicable to other public employees.
The Florida Supreme Court in Farmer held that the petitioner
fully complied with the Gardner requirement by answering ques-
tions, and he was not required to go beyond that by submitting to
a polygraph.3 5 The court acknowledged that it was adopting the
minority position on this issue, but it reasoned that the unreliabil-
ity of the polygraph justified that view.30 The city argued that al-
30. Id. at 278-79.
31. Id. See supra note 28.
32. 392 U.S. at 278 (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 279.
34. 392 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1968).
35. Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 1983).
36. Id. at 189-90.
The court cited several Florida decisions in which the courts have consistently refused to
allow polygraph results to be admitted into court. See, e.g., Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632
(Fla. 1974), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976) (state is admonished against asking questions
which are intended to elicit a response making reference to a polygraph test); Kaminski v.
State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1952) (state may not ask its witness if he had taken a polygraph
test in order to rehabilitate him after his credibility had been impeached); Crawford v.
State, 321 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (per curiam), aff'd, 339 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1976)
(impermissible inference of witness' credibility raised by mention that witness was asked to
submit to a polygraph); City of Miami v. Jervis, 139 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (no
adverse presumption can be drawn from individual's refusal to submit to a polygraph test).
Cf. Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975) (polygraph results are admissible if both par-
ties stipulate to that effect, even if the stipulation is not in writing or made before the
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though polygraphs are inherently unreliable, the tests would assist
the city by providing leads to new information, which could be
used as a basis for discipline." However, the court determined
"that the possible investigative benefit of building a case upon the
foundation of the results of a polygraph examination is too thin a
reed to support a denial of a police officer's right to be subjected
only to lawful and reasonable orders. '38
In conclusion, the court held that the order to take the poly-
graph examination was not a "lawful and reasonable" order and,
therefore, Farmer's refusal to submit to it did not constitute a ba-
sis for termination of employment. 9 A contrary holding, said the
court, would "open the door" to the use of other deception detec-
tion methods such as "hypnosis, sodium pentothal or whatever
other technique any given municipality believes would be of any
assistance in an investigation. '40
Chief Justice Alderman, in dissent, would have affirmed the
Fourth District Court of Appeal on the reasoning articulated in
State Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Zim-
mer.41 In that case, Zimmer, a highway patrol trooper, was under
investigation for stealing property from an accident victim. After
interviews disclosed discrepancies in Zimmer's story, the Director
of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ordered
him to submit to a polygraph. He refused and his employment was
subsequently terminated.2 On appeal, Zimmer was ordered to be
reinstated by the State Career Service Commission. The Commis-
sion relied upon a 1975 opinion of the Attorney General of Florida,
which opined that a State Division of Corrections employee could
not be discharged for refusing to take a polygraph absent a statute
or administrative rule expressly conferring upon the Department
court).
The court took judicial notice of the principles under which the polygraph functions: "A
polygraph operates based on certain assumptions, to wit, that an individual will undergo
physiological changes in blood pressure, breathing rate and galvanic skin responses when he
knowingly makes an untrue statement." The court acknowledged further that variables such
as operator skill, the emotional state of the examinee, the fallibility of the machine and the
inability to quantify the relationship between physiological and emotional states all influ-
ence the machine's validity. Id. at 191-92.
37. Id. at 190.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 191.
40. Id.
41. 398 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
42. Id. at 463-64.
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the authority to order such a test.4 3 In response to this opinion, the
Zimmer court held that the authority to conduct internal investi-
gations by interrogating personnel is implicit in the statute creat-
ing the Highway Patrol. Further, the court said that authorization
to require emloyees to submit to a polygraph examination follows
from this implicit authority to conduct internal investigations."
The Zimmer court also articulated a distinction between public
employees and private employees which Chief Justice Alderman
endorsed in his Farmer dissent:4 5 "The personal integrity of the
employees of a private employer has little, if any, direct impact on
the members of the public; however, the personal integrity of pub-
lic employees has enormous impact on the public and is of serious
concern to the public.' 6
Although not expressly overruling Zimmer, the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Farmer appears certain to have overturned the
premise that supports the Zimmer holding-that the authority to
interrogate employees includes the authority to subject them to a
polygraph examination. The strong position taken by the court in
Farmer, however, is not alone sufficient to settle the law in Florida
on the issue of employment-related polygraph use. The need for a
thorough study based on empirical data makes the subject ripe for
a comprehensive legislative enactment on the subject of polygraph
use in the employment context. The remainder of this note will
discuss the need for such legislation and analyze the policy issues
and drafting considerations that must be taken into account before
the enactment of such a statute.
III. USE OF POLYGRAPHS
A. Practical Utility
The Farmer court was adamant that the results of a polygraph
test could not be used in a subsequent judicial proceeding relating
to any job dismissal.47 Assuming for the moment that this pre-
cludes any disciplinary action predicated upon the polygraph re-
sults, the question arises: Are there other uses for the instrument?
In Farmer, the city argued that there were other ways in which the
43. 1975 FLA. ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 94.
44. Zimmer, 398 So. 2d at 464.
45. Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187, 192 (Fla. 1983) (Alderman, C.J.,
dissenting).
46. Zimmer, 398 So. 2d at 466.
47. Id. at 191.
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polygraph could be utilized. These purported uses included "iden-
tifying co-conspirators or locating the proceeds of the alleged
crime.' 8 The court rejected this argument as insufficient to over-
come the police officer's right to be subjected only to reasonable
orders.'
Other courts, however, have accepted arguments pertaining to
the utility of the polygraph device. Such arguments reason that:
(1) the test may assist investigators in narrowing the scope of sus-
pects, thus allowing them to concentrate their investigative efforts,
saving time and resources; (2) the test may be used as an exculpa-
tory device to clear an officer's good name and restore public confi-
dence in the police department; 0 (3) an officer's willingness to sub-
mit to a test is a factor that may be weighed in considering his
fitness;" and (4) results may be considered in determining whether
discipline is warranted when there is other evidence of
wrongdoing. 52
With regard to private employers, additional justifications be-
come relevant. Employee theft is a major concern of the employers
who have considerable pecuniary interests in their merchandise;
and, therefore, the polygraph may provide a means of isolating in-
ternal security problems and locating stolen goods. In addition to
these purported attributes, a perusal of the polygraph cases dem-
onstrates the effectiveness of the device in persuading a suspected
employee to confess his involvement in the suspected wrongdo-
ing.53 In fact, the leverage gained by the ability to force an em-
ployee to take the polygraph may be the real reason it is so widely
used.54 Similarly, the polygraph may provide a form of deterrent,
as evidenced by the following quotation attributed to Richard M.
Nixon: "Polygraph them all. I don't know anything about
polygraphs andI don't know how accurate they are, but I know
48. Id. at 190.
49. Id.
50. Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213, 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Fichera v. State Per-
sonnel Bd., 32 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Frazee v. Civil Serv. Bd., 338 P.2d 943
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Coursey v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 234 N.E.2d 339 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1967); Roux v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 223 So. 2d 905 (La. Ct. App. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1008 (1970).
51. Coursey v. Board of Fire & Police Commr's, 234 N.E.2d 339, 344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
52. Id. Dolan v. Kelly, 348 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
53. See, e.g., Estes v. City of Grover City, 147 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (police
officer admitted violating policy under threat of polygraph examination).
54. Comment, The Polygraph and Pre-Employment Screening, 13 Hous. L. REv. 551,
552-53 (1976).
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they'll scare the hell out of people. '55
Because none of the aforementioned justifications for polygraph
use involve using the results to establish culpability, it would seem
that the reliability of the machine is irrelevant. The only policy
concern would be whether the purported justifications are suffi-
cient to overcome any interests the employee might have against
submitting to such an examination."
B. Probative Value
When polygraph results are relied on to establish the truthful-
ness of an examinee's answers, however, reliability becomes very
relevant. Even courts that have held that a police officer must sub-
mit to the polygraph test are reluctant to allow adverse results to
be used as evidence to support a discharge.5 However, one court
has held that polygraph results may be considered as evidence in
an administrative hearing, when the polygraphist appears at the
hearing and is subject to direct and cross examination concerning
his qualifications and the procedure used to conduct the test.58
In the private sector, arbitrators have generally followed suit by
not allowing the polygraph results to be admitted into evidence.5 9
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has even upheld an arbitrator's
decision to exclude polygraph results notwithstanding a collective
bargaining agreement that reserved the right of management to re-
quire the employee to submit to the test.6 0
Although most courts, including the Florida Supreme Court in
Farmer, have indicated an unwillingness to admit the results of
polygraph examinations into evidence in support of employee dis-
charges, any subsequent statutory authorization on the use of
55. Comment, Lie Detectors in the Employment Context, 35 LA. L. REv. 694, 694 (1975)
(citing Hearings Before the House Judiciary Committee on the Impeachment of the Presi
dent, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Statement of Information, bk. VII, pt. 2 at 881 (1974)).
56. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Fichera v. State
Personnel Bd., 32 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); City of Sioux City v. Fairbanks, 287
N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1980); Roux v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 223 So. 2d 905 (La. Ct. App.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008 (1970); Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle,
494 P.2d 485 (Wash. 1972).
58. Chambliss v. Board of Fire & Police Commr's, 312 N.E.2d 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
For a criticism of this decision, see Bart v. Department of Law Enforcement, 367 N.E.2d 773
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
59. Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL L. Rv. 1, 34
(1977).
60. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen Local 540 v. Neuhoff Bros. Pack-
ers, 481 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1973).
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polygraphs should expressly preclude the admission of test results
into evidence. Absent such an express limitation, at least one court
has interpreted a statute that authorizes the administration of
these tests as implicitly authorizing the admission of the test re-
sults into evidence. 1
Of course, if adverse polygraph results were admissible, notions
of symmetry would seem to enable the employee to secure an inde-
pendent examination and admit the favorable results into evidence
in mitigation. He may even be permitted to build an affirmative
case based upon favorable polygraph results, even when adverse
results have not been previously introduced.6 2 This could result in
a futile battle of the polygraphists.
Even if the legislature is in agreement with the Farmer holding
and finds the aforementioned purported justifications insufficient
to allow employers to use the polygraph, the need for a compre-
hensive statute to govern the use of polygraphs by employers is
still present.
IV. THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION
One concern is that the Farmer holding only prohibits employers
from discharging employees for refusing to take the polygraph.
This would not seem to prohibit the employer from merely re-
questing that a current employee consent to a polygraph. 3 Fur-
ther, an employer would be able to circumvent the holding by in-
cluding a consent form as part of the job application.6 It strains
61. Appeal of McMullin, 401 A.2d 572 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
The court addressed the issue of whether a law enforcement employee may be properly
discharged based on the polygraph results but found it unnecessary to resolve the issue
because the polygraph results were found, as a factual matter, not to have formulated the
basis for the dismissal. Id. at 574 n.1. The court did point out, however, in dicta, that a
holding that prohibited the use of these results as a basis for termination would seem to
contradict the statutory authorization to administer these exams to police personnel. Id.
However, this is not necessarily correct. As pointed out in other decisions, one purported use
for the polygraph is the elimination of innocent persons from a field of suspects. See also
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
62. See Bart v. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 367 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
63. See Comment, Regulation of Polygraph Testing in the Employment Context: Sug-
gested Statutory Control on Test Use and Examiner Competence, 15 U.C.D. L. REv. 113
(1981) (statutes which prohibit employers from "demanding" employees to take a polygraph
test are easily circumvented by this procedure).
64. State v. Community Distribs., 304 A.2d 213, 218 (N.J. Monmouth County Ct. 1973),
aff'd, 317 A.2d 695 (1974) (describing the psychological factors which compel an employee or
prospective employee to submit to a polygraph, even when only "requested" by manage-
ment). See also Swope v. Florida Indus. Comm'n Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 159 So. 2d 653
(Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (holding that a discharged employee could not be denied unemployment
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credulity to fathom a prospective employee not feeling compelled
to sign the waiver for fear that, if he does not sign, he will not be
offered employment.6 The compulsion to comply with the em-
ployer's "request" would also seem to hold true for current em-
ployees, although not as strongly as with job applicants. In fact,
the employer may aggravate the employee's psychological desires
to comply with the "request" by subtle coercion, which is just
short of a formal "demand."66 Absent a statute that prevents this
behavior, the Farmer decision, and its resulting protection, may be
reduced to a nullity within a short period of time.6
To combat this problem, many states have enacted legislation
that not only prohibits an employer from demanding that an em-
ployee take the polygraph, but also prohibits the less imperative
"requests." The language used in these statutes is varied. Some
states prohibit an employer from requiring, requesting, or sug-
gesting that an employee take a polygraph.6 s The District of Co-
lumbia provides an equally pervasive prohibition by preventing the
employer from administering or having administered, or accepting,
or using the results of the test." Maine provides perhaps the most
pervasive statutory prohibition. That state's statute prohibits em-
ployers from requiring, suggesting or requesting, administering,
causing to be administered, or using or referring to the results of
any test. Further, even if the employee requests that the test be
given to him, the test must be administered in the presence of a
witness chosen by the employee, the test must be recorded, and
the results may not be used by the employer against the em-
ployee.70 An equally comprehensive statute has recently been en-
acted by the Michigan legislature. It prohibits employers from re-
benefits when the discharge was for refusing to take a polygraph, but reserving judgment on
the effect of a pre-employment waiver).
65. See State v. Community Distribs., 304 A.2d 213, 218 (N.J. Monmouth County Ct.
1973).
66. See, e.g., Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1981).
67. In two recent cases, police officers had agreed as part of the application process that
they would submit to a polygraph exam at a later time if requested. Their later discharges
for refusal to submit to the test were sustained on appeal. Kersey v. Shipley, 673 F.2d 730
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 80 (1982); Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 415 So. 2d
62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
68. Alaska, Connecticut (request or require); Delaware, Maine, New York (prohibits only
regarding voice stress test). See supra note 6 for citations to statutes.
69. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-802(a) (1973). See also Massachusetts (subjects or request, di-
rectly or indirectly); Oregon (subject to, directly or indirectly); Rhode Island (require, sub-
ject or cause, directly or indirectly to take); Washington (require or subject to test), cited
supra note 6.
70. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7166 (Supp. 1982-83).
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questing, requiring, administering, threatening to administer or
attempting to administer a polygraph to employees or applicants.7 I
Two states allow the employer to request the employee to sub-
mit to the polygraph test if the employee is advised of his right to
refuse .7 One state requires that the right to refuse be communi-
cated in writing7 3 and the other state merely requires that the em-
ployer advise the employee that the test is voluntary. 74 The partic-
ular language used in these statutes is immaterial as long as it
prohibits the employer from circumventing the prohibition against
polygraph use by coercive means.
Another concern, which militates in favor of a statute on this
subject, is the disparate treatment among various classes of em-
ployees under the current law. Although the Farmer decision
clearly protects the tenured employee, other classes of employees
appear to be less well guarded. The present state of the law is am-
biguous. Can a polygraph be given to an employee in the private
sector? Can a polygraph be required of a deputy sheriff?. How
about a job applicant, as opposed to a tenured employee?
In Swope v. Florida Industrial Commission Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review,7 5 the court held that an employee
who had been discharged from a department store for refusing to
take a polygraph had not committed "misconduct" within the
meaning of the unemployment compensation statute and, there-
fore, could not be denied unemployment benefits.78 The Zimmer
court apparently read the Swope decision as a prohibition against
discharging private sector employees based upon a refusal to sub-
mit to a polygraph, because it thought it necessary to distinguish
private sector employees from their public sector counterparts.77
Not only was this distinction tenuous,78 but it was also unneces-
sary. Swope does not preclude an employer from discharging a pri-
vate sector employee for refusing to take a polygraph, but merely
71. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 37.203 (Supp. 1983).
72. California and Minnesota.
73. California.
74. Minnesota.
75. 159 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963).
76. Id. at 653-54.
77. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Zimmer, 398 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla.
4th DCA 1981) (Anstead, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 46.
78. The distinction made by the court may be valid when the public employee is a police
officer and the private employee is a floor sweeper, but it would seem ludicrous when the
public employee is a street sweeper and the private employee is a lawyer, doctor, druggist,
architect or brake assemblyman in a GM factory.
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holds that, absent a pre-employment condition requiring him to
submit, the employee is entitled to unemployment benefits. 9 In
fact, before the Farmer decision, the Swope holding was probably
equally applicable to public employees who were discharged for re-
fusing to submit to a polygraph.80
The Swope decision expressly leaves unanswered the question of
whether acceptance of a job by an employee with notice of the test
requirement would yield the same result. Further, Swope does not
impede the employer's right to predicate discharge upon the re-
fusal to submit to a polygraph. The Farmer decision sheds little or
no light on either of these situations. Hence, the result in Florida
could be that public sector employees receive far greater protection
than private sector employees. This result is not necessarily unfa-
vorable, but does represent an anomaly when contrasted with the
policies of the legislatures of the twenty states that have enacted
legislation limiting the polygraph's use in the employment con-
text.8' This is another area that the legislature should consider in
formulating a statute, for there seems to be no cogent reason for
excluding private sector employees.
Another question in need of legislative attention is whether dep-
uty sheriffs can be required to take a polygraph. The present state
of the law in Florida is that deputy sheriffs can be so compelled."'
This is partially premised upon the fact that sheriffs in Florida are
constitutional officers who have the right to appoint deputies and,
likewise, to withdraw the appointment without a specific reason.8a
While the constitutional authority of sheriffs may be pervasive
enough to justify this holding, it seems intuitively unfair to con-
done the disparate treatment of law enforcement officers who per-
form similar functions within the same state. 4 This is especially so
after considering that a deputy sheriff who is discharged for refus-
79. Valley Vendors v. Jamieson, 630 P.2d 61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (on facts similar to
Swope, the court expressly limited its decision to only preclude the denial of benefits,
thereby having no effect on the right to discharge an employee).
80. City of Dallas v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 626 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981)
(although the city properly discharged an employee for refusing to submit to a polygraph, it
was not "misconduct" within contemplation of the unemployment statute). See also deci-
sions cited in Valley Vendors v. Jamieson, 630 P.2d 61, 66 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
81. See supra notes 5 & 6.
82. Fraternal Order of Police v. Freeman, 372 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
83. Id. at 947.
84. Only one state treats deputy sheriffs differently from other police officers with regard
to the polygraph requirement. Nebraska requires by statute that deputy sheriffs submit to a
polygraph upon commencement of their employment and thereafter whenever requested.
Nz.. REv. STAT. § 23-1737 (1943).
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ing to submit to a polygraph may seek and be denied employment
as a municipal police officer on the grounds that he was involunta-
rily discharged for exercising a right that is inherent in the posi-
tion that he seeks."5
Another category of employee that is particularly vulnerable,
even after the Farmer decision, is that of the prospective em-
ployee. Since the use of polygraph examinations by employers is a
mandatory subject for collective bargaining, employers of organ-
ized labor are prohibited, in most circumstances, from unilaterally
imposing the exam as a condition of continued employment."
Therefore, unionized private sector employees are able to protect
themselves by bargaining with management.8 7
These protections are not available to the prospective employee
in either the public or private sector. The situation is particularly
acute in the private sector. Since private employment does not in-
volve state action, remedies for constitutional violations are un-
available under section 1983 of title 42, United States Code. Ab-
sent a statute protecting this class of employee, a wrongfully
denied applicant in the private sector may have no legal redress.8
The situation is not much better for the public sector employee.
Although a section 1983 action is available, considerable hurdles
must be overcome before a successful prosecution may be pursued
under this theory.89 That this is true is demonstrated by a recent
85. The Michigan Legislature had enacted a statute which, as construed, prohibited a
sheriff from discharging a deputy based upon a refusal to submit to a polygraph. MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1726 (1976) (current version in MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37-201 to
-209 (1983)); see also Cyrus v. Calhoun County Sheriff, 271 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978). The statute withstood constitutional challenge based upon the fact that sheriffs in
Michigan are constitutional officers. The court stated: "The power of the Legislature is also
constitutionally created ... and through that power the [legislature has passed both stat-
utes at issue in this case. The constitutional underpinning of one is not greater than that of
the other." 271 N.W.2d at 251.
86. Miller, Worker Privacy and Collective Bargaining, 33 LAB. L.J. 154, 160 (1982). See
also Craver, supra note 59, at 32-33.
87. Prior to the Farmer decision, many police officers also protected themselves through
collective bargaining agreements. In a recent study of 58 police collective bargaining agree-
ments in Florida, 21 contracts addressed the issue of whether a police officer could be re-
quired to take a polygraph when he is the subject of an internal investigation. Of the 21
contracts, 18 provided that an officer could not be so compelled. Stewart, Police and
Firefighter Collective Bargaining in Florida, Center for Employee Relations and the Law,
Monograph No. 2, at 77 (1979). The Farmer decision may, therefore, have some impact on
collective bargaining because police bargaining units will no longer have to bargain for a
favorable provision on polygraphs.
88. Toomey, Compelled Lie Detector Tests and Public Employees: What Happened to
the Fifth Amendment?, 21 S. Tsx. L.J. 375, 386 (1981).
89. Webb v. Village of Streamwood, No. 79-C-4021, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1981).
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decision of an Illinois federal district court. In that case the plain-
tiff, a police officer applicant, had successfully completed a battery
of exams, including physical agility, medical, written, and oral
tests, and was placed on an eligibility list. He was subsequently
offered a position, contingent upon his successful completion of a
polygraph. The plaintiff submitted to the exam; however, in the
opinion of the polygraphist, the plaintiff had been deceptive. This
opinion was founded upon the fact that the plaintiff had purposely
controlled his breathing.90 This conclusion was based upon the fact
that the plaintiff's respiration cycles were eight to ten per minute
while the normal rate, according to the examiner, is eighteen to
twenty-one. Based on this information, the city removed the plain-
tiff's name from the list of eligible job applicants.
However, after offering additional information to establish his
integrity and character, the plaintiff convinced the city to allow
him to take another test. The second test was inconclusive, al-
though the same examiner indicated that the plaintiff's breathing
rate was still, in his opinion, "far below normal." 9' The plaintiff
submitted an affidavit from a medical doctor who stated that the
plaintiff's breathing rate of eight to ten was "normal" and indica-
tive of a "calm disposition and excellent respiratory function." De-
spite this evidence, the plaintiff was denied employment.9"
The plaintiff overcame the first hurdle when the court held that
his position on the eligibility list constituted a protected property
interest under Illinois law. Nevertheless, the court held that the
defendant's actions were not arbitrary and capricious and denied
plaintiff's claim for relief.9"
In a leading law review article, Professor Hermann, in arguing
for a federal statute to protect the prospective employee from pol-
ygraph testing, made the following observations:
The prospective employee increasingly finds himself subject to
unilaterally established personnel selection requirements which,
for a great many jobs, include polygraph and personality testing.
The reliability of the polygraph and the validity of personality
testing are highly questionable, but the most serious threat posed
by the use of the instrument is the invasion of the personal lib-
erty of the worker subjected to interrogation. Polygraph testing is
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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an attempt to overbear the will of the person subjected to testing
by measuring uncontrolled physiological responses, while person-
ality testing poses much the same problem by attempting to reach
beyond the conscious, articulated response of the person being ex-
amined. It is the character of the interrogation itself-focusing on
past acts and associations, ferreting out attitudes, opinions, and
beliefs about sex, politics, and religion-which presents the criti-
cal threat to individual integrity by the invasion of personal
privacy."
Although no federal legislation has been enacted to date, the leg-
islatures of twenty states have enacted statutes to protect this class
of citizens. 5
V. INVASION OF PRIVACY
The most frequently stated constitutional objection to polygraph
tests is that they are an invasion of the right to privacy as recog-
nized in the landmark Supreme Court case of Griswold v. Connect-
icut."9 Additionally, in Florida, the constitutional right of privacy
under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution may prohibit
"granting public employers carte blanche authority to force em-
ployees to submit to unlimited questioning during a lie detector
test. '97 One commentator has isolated four aspects of polygraph
testing that are particularly intrusive and, arguably, constitute an
invasion of personal privacy. The first aspect is the technical pro-
cedure used.
A blood pressure device similar to those used by physicians mea-
sures the subject's heart rate and blood pressure. A pneumograph,
a tube fastened around the examinee's chest and abdomen, mea-
sures the examinee's rate of breathing by monitoring expansion of
the chest and abdomen. Finally, electrodes fastened to the ex-
aminee's index and ring fingers monitor the variations in flow of
electrical current through the subject's body. 6
94. Hermann, Privacy, The Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need
To Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73, 153-54 (1973). See
also Craver, supra note 59, at 42 (recommending total abolition of pre-employment poly-
graph tests).
95. See supra note 6.
96. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also United States v. Perkins, 383 F. Supp. 922, 926 n.1
(N.D. Ohio 1974).
97. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Zimmer, 398 So. 2d 463, 468 (Fla.
4th DCA 1981) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
98. Comment, supra note 63, at 117 n.17.
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The second aspect is the broad scope of inquiry used by
polygraphists covering areas not pertinent to the ultimate informa-
tion sought, for example, opinions on sex, politics and religion."
Third, transcripts of the test may become part of the employee's
file. Finally, the machine continuously monitors the subject's bod-
ily functions, eliciting responses from the subject even when he
chooses not to answer. 100
In Fraternal Order of Police v. Freeman, the court suggested
that while administration of the polygraph is not an invasion of
privacy, publishing the results or exceeding the proper scope of an
examination may constitute a violation.101
Although this section is not intended as a full exposition on the
subject of privacy in polygraph testing,102 it is offered as an intro-
duction to the topic for two reasons: 1) as further argument in sup-
port of the need for a statute that will govern this area, and 2) in
the event that such a statute is enacted, to demonstrate the need
for procedures and safeguards that will protect the valued consti-
tutional right of privacy.108
VI. OTHER DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS
A. Protected Class
One important issue in considering a polygraph statute is the
question of whom to include in the protected class. This note has
already discussed those employees excluded under present law and
the need for remedial legislation to include them.", However, what
99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
100. Comment, supra note 63, at 117-18. Compare the Fichera decision. In response to
an argument that the mandatory imposition of polygraph exams upon police officers is an
invasion of privacy, the Fichera court said:
The polygraph is an extension of the age-old process of assessing the veracity of
a witness, by scrutinizing his facial expression, rubescence, tremors, evasion of
meeting the eye, and the like. It works through externals and is quite distinct
from drug induced revelation, hypnosis, or any other form of narcoanalysis. In the
limited field of cases such as this one, and those of the prior cases cited above, we
find no deprivation of constitutional or legal rights.
Fichera v. State Personnel Bd., 32 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
101. 372 So. 2d 945, 948 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
102. For a more detailed analysis of these considerations, see Hermann, supra note 94,
at 126-36. See also Castagnera-Cain, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and Use of Lie De-
tectors in Employee Relations-An Overview, 4 GLENDALE L. REy. 189, 195-207 (1981).
103. See Perkins, 383 F. Supp. at 926 n.1. See also State v. Community Distribs., 304
A.2d 213, 16 (N.J. Monmouth County Ct. 1973), affd, 317 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1974).
104. See infra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
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has not been explored is the classes of employees who have been
specifically excluded in other jurisdictions and the purported justi-
fications for these discrepancies in treatment.
As previously noted, the dichotomy between public and private
sector employees has been recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court insofar as the privilege against self-incrimination is
concerned.'0 5 Because a public sector employee is responsible only
to his employer, the Court has held that the privilege does not bar
compelling employees to answer questions that constitute an ac-
counting for the public trust.106 The Court made clear in Uni-
formed Sanitation Men that these considerations extend to all
public employees, not only to police officers. 07
It would seem that the same rationale used by the Court in justi-
fying the disparate treatment in the compelled questioning context
would also be applicable in the case of questioning through the
medium of polygraphs. 08 Most states, however, have not drawn
the line here. Instead, they have chosen to give protection to all
public employees except police officers.'09 One state statute excepts
from its protection police applicants and police employees who are
seeking promotion to the rank of captain or higher." 0 Ironically, in
California, the courts of which were the first to condone the ad-
ministration of polygraph exams to police officers,"' two statutes
have been enacted, the net effect of which allows employers to ad-
minister polygraphs to all public employees except police
105. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
106. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968).
107. Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1968).
The Zimmer court justified the public/private dichotomy as follows: "The personal integ-
rity of the employees of a private employer has little, if any, direct impact on the members
of the public; however, the personal integrity of public employees has enormous impact on
the public and is of serious concern to the public." State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor
Vehicles v. Zimmer 398 So. 2d 463, 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). This distinction is also en-
dorsed by Chief Justice Alderman in his Farmer dissent. Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale,
427 So. 2d 187, 192 (Fla. 1983) (Alderman, C.J. dissenting). As previously argued, however,
this distinction is unconvincing. See supra note 78. Rather than make the division at the
public/private line, it would seem more logical to exempt certain categories of employee
from a general prohibition against the polygraph based on the sensitive nature of the em-
ployee's position.
108. See, e.g., Rivera v. City of Douglas, 644 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (public works
employees could be required under Garrity and its progeny to submit to a polygraph).
109. See, e.g., statutes of Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. These stat-
utes are cited supra at note 6.
110. WASH. REv. CODE ANN, § 49.44.120 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
111. See McCain v. Sheridan, 324 P.2d 923 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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officers. 112
The justification for these different approaches is unclear. The
Iowa Supreme Court, in holding that a city mechanic could not be
compelled to submit to a polygraph, distinguished cases involving
police officers and firefighters by reasoning that those cases focused
on the "unique law-oriented position such officers hold in our soci-
ety . . . as well as the paramilitary character of those depart-
ments."' 13 Another state supreme court, however, included police-
men, but specifically excluded firemen from the requirement where
the investigated activity involved a crime committed outside the
performance of the fireman's official duties." 4
Another purported justification for the disparate treatment of
police officers concerns the constitutional right of privacy. One
court has stated that the right of privacy confers upon the private
citizen a right to refuse to submit to a polygraph. 1 5 In contrast,
the court said that a police officer has "subordinated his right of
privacy as a private citizen to the superior right of the public to an
efficient and credible police department." 116 While the invasion of
privacy may be a legitimate concern in drafting a polygraph stat-
ute,11 7 it would not seem to be a valid reason for the aforemen-
tioned double standard." 8
Probably the most widely cited justification for requiring police
officers to submit to the polygraph was articulated by an early Cal-
ifornia court: "[Tihe basis was the need for confidence of the pub-
lic in officers who have sworn to uphold and enforce the laws,
which require officers, under certain circumstances, to risk self-in-
crimination, not in defense against accusation of criminal conduct,
but in the course of maintaining their positions.""'  This seems to
be the most logical distinction between police officers and other
public employees. A police officer is sworn to uphold the law. He
112. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3307 (West
1980); see also Estes v. City of Grover City, 147 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct. App. 1978) (interpreted
statute which creates a privilege against compelling an officer to submit to a polygraph test
as a bar to admission of statement made by officer under threat of polygraph, even when the
statement was made prior to enactment of statute).
113. In re Fairbanks, 287 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 1980).
114. Talent v. City of Abilene, 508 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1974).
115. Richardson v. City of Pasedena, 500 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 513 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1974).
116. Id.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 96-103.
118. Cf. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (police officer not relegated to
watered-down version of constitutional rights).
119. Fichera v. State Personnel Bd., 32 Cal. Rptr. 159, 163 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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has a high degree of power, and an abuse of this power can have a
devastating impact on the citizens he has sworn to protect. Fur-
ther, if a police department is to be effective, the public must have
confidence in it, which means that the department must be able to
free itself of bad employees. Hence, there may exist limited cir-
cumstances where a polygraph exam is necessary to guard the pub-
lic trust. Any such statute should be carefully written, however, so
as to authorize the administration of these exams only when abso-
lutely necessary.
Several states have exempted other classes of employees from
the blanket protection of an anti-polygraph statute. As previously
discussed, California exempts all public employees except police
officers.12 0 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington exempt em-
ployees who have access to dangerous drugs. 21 New Jersey evi-
dently enacted the statutory exemption after a court refused to ju-
dicially create it and held that a drug store owner was criminally
liable for requiring an employee to take a polygraph test. 2' The
argument advanced to justify this exemption is one that combines
the property interests of the employer with the public interest in
preventing dangerous drugs from entering the illicit market.2 "
Other exceptions include persons who hold positions of national
security,' 2 4 and fire department and corrections personnel.12 5
In addition to the aforementioned exemptions, which target cer-
tain classes of individuals, one state provides an exception for tests
administered by law enforcement agencies conducting criminal in-
vestigations. 26 Two states exempt tests administered by law en-
forcement agencies in the performance of official duties. 2 Reading
these exceptions in the context of the statutes, it appears that they
were intended to insure that the prohibition against polygraphs
would only extend to employer/employee scenarios, leaving law en-
forcement officials free to request individuals to take polygraph
examinations.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the
language of the Massachusetts statute differently. In Baker v. City
120. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982).
121. See supra note 6.
122. State v. Community Distribs., 304 A.2d 213 (N.J. Monmouth County Ct. 1973),
afl'd, 317 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1974).
123. Id.
124. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.44.120 (Supp. 19S2).
125. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-802(b) (1981).
126. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West 1982).
127. Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1979).
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of Lawrence,128 police officers were implicated in a larceny and
were told to take a polygraph. Relying on the statute, the officers
refused. The court interpreted the aforementioned exception as a
legislative recognition of the "interest of the employer in applying
some pressure to assist an investigation leading to exoneration of
the employee or the opposite.' 29 Therefore, under this interpreta-
tion, a police agency may request or demand that an employee
take a polygraph whenever a crime is suspected. The exception has
also been interpreted to allow private employers to coerce employ-
ees into taking an exam when the exam is administered by police
officers who are investigating a criminal violation. 30 Thus, when a
crime is involved, the employer is able to accomplish indirectly
what he cannot achieve directly.
To avoid this anomalous result, language such as that used in
the New York statute is recommended. That statute expressly lim-
its its applicability to employer/employee relationships and is not
as vulnerable to misconstruction as the Massachusetts statute.''
VII. SAFEGUARDS
In the event that the Florida Legislature determines that certain
classes of employees should be exempted from the protection of an
anti-polygraph statute, that statute should include safeguards to
ensure that the ensuing exam is as fair as possible. This area
should cover competency of the device used, competency of the ex-
aminer, conditions under which an exam may be required or re-
quested, the scope of the examination, the procedure used during
the exam, and representation by counsel and/or union
representatives.
A. Test Device
Many of the state statutes presently in force inadequately define
the particular testing device that is to be used. Almost all the stat-
utes prohibit the use of the polygraph or lie detector test. These
statutes, however, may not be broad enough to prohibit other de-
ception detection devices.1 32 The polygraph is the most reliable of
128. 409 N.E.2d 710 (Mass. 1979).
129. Id. at 714.
130. Baldassare v. Delta Air Lines, No. 79-1997-T, slip op. (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 1982).
131. NY. LAB. LAW § 733-35 (McKinney 1978).
132. See, e.g., statutes in Alaska (polygraph or lie detecting device), Hawaii (polygraph
or lie detector), Maryland (polygraph or similar test), Massachusetts (lie detector tests),
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any of these devices, and by narrowly wording the statutes to pro-
hibit only this device, the less reliable tests are the ones being con-
doned. 33 Some states have attempted to cure this problem with a
broad definition of "polygraph."'" 4 The legislatures of two states,
New York and Wisconsin, have apparently drawn the line around
devices determined to be less reliable. The New York statute pro-
hibits only the use of voice stress tests in the employment con-
text.185 The Wisconsin Legislature takes a more rational approach
by first prohibiting everything, then accepting the test that it be-
lieves most reliable and defining it by its physical characteristics
rather than by a generic label."3 '
None of the states that exclude particular classes of people from
the protection of their statutes provide any minimum require-
ments on the type of machine that can be used to test these indi-
viduals. California, which gives police officers broader protection
than other public sector employees, 87 takes a rather curious ap-
proach by prohibiting employers from compelling police officers to
take a "polygraph." Apparently, an officer in California could be
New Jersey (lie detector test), Washington (lie detector or similar test), supra note 6.
133. McGinigle v. Town of Greenburgh, 399 N.Y.S.2d 250 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), rev'd,
425 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1978) (distinguishes polygraph from B & W psychometer in that the for-
mer gives a permanent record of four bodily functions and can be expertly prepared and
administered). In addition to the machine's assets, statutes such as that of Florida provide
licensing requirements that facilitate operator competence. FLA. STAT. §§ 493.561-.569
(1981). See also Quade, Use of Honesty Tests Raises Privacy Issue, 68 ABA L.J. 671 (1982)
(Minnesota court rules that honesty test is not within the prohibition of the anti-polygraph
statute).
134. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7153(4) (Supp. 1982-83) ("polygraph means
a lie detector, polygraph, deceptograph, psychological stress evaluator or other device, mech-
anism or instrument, regardless of what it is called, which is operated or the results of which
are used or interpreted by a polygraph examiner for the purpose of detecting deception or
verifying truth of statements"). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51g (West 1958 &
Supp. 1982) ("polygraph means any mechanical or electrical instrument or device of any
type used or allegedly used to examine, test or question individuals for the purpose of deter-
mining truthfulness").
135. Defined as a "mechanical device or instrument which purports to determine the
truth or falsity of statements . . .on the basis of vocal fluctuations or vocal stress." N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 733 (McKinney 1978).
136. The Wisconsin statute provides:
This subsection does not apply to the use of an instrument or device for the pur-
pose of verifying truthfulness or detecting deception, or assisting in the reporting
of a diagnostic opinion as to either of these, which, at a minimum, is capable of
recording visually, permanently and simultaneously indications of a person's car-
diovascular pattern and changes therein and a person's respiratory pattern and
changes therein.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.37 (West 1982).
137. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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compelled to submit to a "voice stress test" or other less reliable
instruments.
The point of this discussion is that, if it is the legislature's intent
to prohibit all such testing, then the language used should be per-
vasive enough to prevent circumvention by the use of other ma-
chines not expressly prohibited by the statute. 3 ' If, however, the
legislature intends to draw class exceptions to the statute, then
those individuals should only be subject to tests on the most relia-
ble device. Further, rather than merely naming the devices, the
statute should describe the characteristics of the machine.
B. Examiner Competence
Approximately twenty states have now enacted legislation to
regulate polygraph examiner competence. 39 Many of these statutes
were enacted after one of the foremost authorities on polygraphs,
Fred Inbau, revealed that eighty percent of all polygraph operators
were incompetent. 140
While an analysis of these statutes is beyond the scope of this
note, two comments on the Florida statute are relevant. First, the
Florida statute applies only to polygraphs.14 ' Therefore, if any test-
ing is allowed in the employment context, it should only involve
machines that fall within the gamut of the licensing statute. Sec-
ond, it should be noted that the licensing statute does not apply to
examiners employed by municipal, county, state or federal agen-
138. See, e.g., Maine statute, supra note 134.
139. As compiled in Comment, supra note 63, at 115-16, these states are Alabama (ALA.
CODE tit. 34, §§ 25-1 to -36 (1977 & Supp. 1981)); Arizona (Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
32.2701-.2715 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981)); Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-2201 to -2225
(1979)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.561-.569 (West 1981)); Georgia (GA. CODE §§ 84-
5001 to -5016 (1975)); Illinois (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, §§ 2401-2432 (1978 & Cum. Supp.
1981)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. §§ 329.020-.990 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1981)); Maine (ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 7151-7169 (Cum. Supp. 1981)); Michigan (MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§
338.1701-.1729 (1970 & Supp. 1981)); Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-1 to -47
(1973)); Nevada (NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 648.055-.210 (1979)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
67-31A-1 to -11 (1974)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66.49.1-.8 (1975)); North Da-
kota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-31-01 to -17 (1978 & Supp. 1979)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit.
59 §§ 1451-1476 (West Cum. Supp. 1980)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 703.050-.140 (1979));
South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-53-10 to -250 (1976 & Supp. 1980)); Utah (UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 34-37-1 to -14 (1974 & Supp. 1979)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 , §§
2901-10 (Supp. 1981)); Virginia (VA. CODE §§ 54-916 to -922 (1978)).
140. Comment, supra note 55, at 702 n.49 (citing Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs as
"Lie Detectors" by the Federal Government Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations
and Government Information of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 168 (1964)).
141. FLA. STAT. § 493.561(5) (1981).
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cies, provided that the examiners are using the device "in the per-
formance of [their] official duties." 4" Absent credible data showing
that these examiners are as competent as licensed examiners (who
must meet educational and internship requirements),143 they
should not be permitted to conduct examinations in the employ-
ment context. This will provide the employee some protection
from incompetent examiners.
C. Prerequisites and Scope of Examination
If certain classes of employees are exempt from the protections
of an anti-polygraph statute, (for example, police officers and/or
persons having access to dangerous drugs), the statute should pro-
vide safeguards that will ensure that the examination is used only
under circumstances when it is reasonably necessary to protect the
asserted public interest. For example, drug store employees should
not be required to submit to a polygraph examination, unless it
has been established that drugs are missing and that the particular
employee is "suspected," based on some objective criteria.1 44 Simi-
larly, police officers should not be subjected to the polygraph due
to a concern over incidents which are minor in nature, such as non-
criminal violations of departmental policy that would not ordina-
rily subject the officer to dismissal. 14" In all cases, the polygraph
should not be used when less intrusive means of satisfactorily con-
cluding the investigation are available.' 4' This requirement was ap-
parently satisfied in Farmer, since the FBI had investigated the
incident for over a year and was unable to reach a solution.
In an often cited decision on this topic, the Washington Su-
preme Court, after articulating the seriousness of the allegations
against the police officers and the need for a thorough investigation
to restore public confidence, said:
Under these circumstances, we conclude and hold that if, in the
exercise of prudent judgment, the investigating authority deter-
mines it reasonably necessary to utilize the polygraph examina-
142. FLA. STAT. § 493.562 (1981).
143. See FLA. STAT. §§ 493.566-.569 (1981).
144. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 40A-1 (West 1981) (unconditional exception).
145. Cf. Richardson v. City of Pasedena, 500 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 513 S.W.2d (Tex. 1974) (held that a police officer can be required to
take polygraph during investigation of any matter relating to his efficiency and credibility).
146. Cf. Eshelman v. Blubaum, 560 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (polygraph
always proper to verify statements regardless of whether or not all other avenues of investi-
gation have been exhausted).
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tion as an investigatory tool to test the dependability of prior an-
swers of suspected officers to questions specifically, narrowly, and
directly related to the performance of their official duties, then,
such investigating authority may properly request such officers to
submit to a polygraph test under pain of dismissal for refusal.
Bearing in mind that the reasonableness of an investigating au-
thority's request, under varying circumstances, can be subjected
to judicial scrutiny and abuses of discretion thereby curbed, cou-
pled with the fact that, in any event, the results of a polygraph
test and a subject's willingness or unwillingness to take the test
cannot be admitted into evidence in subsequent criminal proceed-
ings, we see no constitutional or legal barrier to the conclusion we
have reached.14 7
As stated by the Washington court, not only should the nature of
the investigation warrant this extreme measure and the request be
reasonable, 14  but the scope of the questioning should be narrow
enough to comport with the requirements set forth in Gardner.1 49
The scope of questioning in polygraph examinations has been
the subject of considerable controversy.15 0 This is due partially to
the nature of the polygraph interview itself. Certain questions are
used as controls to ascertain how the subject reacts when he tells
the truth and when he lies.1 51 The problem is particularly acute for
the prospective employee where the topic of questioning is very
broad and can easily become an invasion of personal privacy.15 2
The scope of questions that may be asked of applicants should be
limited by statute to exclude nonrelevant topics.153
In the public sector, current employees are afforded some pro-
tection through the Gardner decision in that questioning must spe-
cifically relate to the performance of their duties. Of course, defini-
tional problems come into play with regard to this requirement. 1"
147. Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle, 494 P.2d 485, 493 (Wash. 1972).
148. Cf. Myers v. Cook County Police and Corrections Merit Bd., 384 N.E.2d 805 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978) (order that officer take the polygraph need not be reasonable for discharge
based on refusal to submit). See Toomey, supra note 88, at 383 (Myers decision is
anomalous).
149. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
150. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Zimmer, 398 So. 2d 463, 467
(Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (scope of polygraph exam "virtually unlimited"); Seattle Police Of-
ficers' Guild v. City of Seattle, 494 P.2d 485, 496 (Wash. 1972) (technique of operator is to
ask "irrelevant questions").
151. See Hermann, supra note 94, at 80-83.
152. Id. at 82-83.
153. See, e.g., supra note 94 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Talent v. City of Abilene, 508 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1974) (theft of pickup
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Conversly, private sector employees are not protected by the Gard-
ner requirement. Any statute which excepts private sector employ-
ees should provide scope limitations similar to those afforded pub-
lic employees through the Gardner decision. As one commentator
concludes:
Mandatory lie detector examinations should be countenanced
only when all of the following conditions exist: (1) serious em-
ployee misconduct is suspected, involving a substantial threat to
production, discipline, or safety; (2) less drastic investigative
techniques have been either unsuccessfully attempted or rejected
as unworkable under the particular circumstances; (3) the em-
ployer has accumulated sufficient independent evidence to create
a reasonable suspicion that the worker in question possesses rele-
vant information that he has refused to disclose voluntarily. Even
where a compulsory lie detector test is appropriate, the scope of
inquiry should be as narrow as possible. Although the polygraph
operator may have to ask personal questions not directly related
to the present employment context for the purpose of calibrating
the machine, none of the responses to such questions should be
disclosed to management officials or other parties. Only answers
directly related to the specific misconduct necessitating the exam-
ination should be divulged, and only to appropriate persons. 5 1
As to the test results, one state has added a precaution which
prohibits disclosing the results of a polygraph test to anyone not
authorized by the employee to receive them.5 6 This additional pre-
caution seems well advised and would help ensure that the em-
ployee's privacy interests are protected. 157
D. Procedures Used
In Frey v. Department of Police,15 8 a police officer took three
polygraph examinations, all within the course of a day. When the
examinations proved inconclusive, he was ordered to return on the
next day. He refused, claiming exhaustion, and requested a contin-
uance, which was denied. The court, quoting the police super-
truck while off-duty was not sufficiently related to fireman's duties to give fire chief author-
ity to require polygraph examination).
155. Craver, supra note 59, at 41-42.
156. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.76 (West 1980).
157. The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in State v. Century Camera, Inc.,
309 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1981).
158. 288 So. 2d 410 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
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intendant's testimony that an immediate investigation into plain-
tiff's bribery activity was necessary, upheld the discharge for
insubordination, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the order
was unreasonable.159
In Florida, because of a statutory "Bill of Rights," law enforce-
ment officers are probably protected from this type of practice. 60
In addition to statutory protections, employees in the public and
private sectors may be protected by collective bargaining agree-
ments. Nevertheless, any statute which authorizes the administra-
tion of polygraph tests should, for the benefit of applicants and
non-union employees, set forth a procedure for the conduct of ex-
aminations covering such areas as: 1) timely notice of the conduct
being investigated (including a list of the questions to be asked); 2)
place of the interview; 3) compensation for the employee's time; 4)
reasonable periods of rest during the questioning and between ex-
aminations, if more than one is given; 5) a cap on the number of
exams that can be administered to an employee during the same
investigation; 6) the right to explain any answers that the examiner
believes are evasive or deceptive; 7) the right to have the printed
graph interpreted by a second examiner; 8) the right to receive a
copy of the results; and 9) the requirement that a copy of any stat-
utory rights be given to the employee or applicant before the ad-
ministration of the exam.
E. Representation
In addition to the aforementioned protections, an employee
should be entitled to representation at the examination. In the
public sector, because Garrity and Gardner protect the police of-
ficer against self-incrimination, most courts have held that there is
no constitutional right to counsel at these examinations. 61 In the
private sector, it would seem that the same reasoning obtains; a
compelled statement is not voluntary, and is, therefore, inadmissi-
ble. However, the absence of state action in the private context
may alter the result in that scenario.
At a minimum, in the case of organized employees, it is clear
that there exists a right to union representation during a polygraph
159. Id. at 412.
160. FLA. STAT. § 112.532(1) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
161. See, e.g., Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Eshelman v.
Blubaum, 560 P.2d 1283 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). Cf. Baxley v. City of North Charleston, 533
F. Supp. 1248 (D.S.C. 1982) (holding that examinee is entitled to counsel when investigation
involves criminal allegations).
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS
exam. In a recent decision, the Public Employees Relations Com-
mission held that a police officer is entitled to union representation
at a polygraph exam. 62 The Commission considered an argument
that the presence of a third person at the exam would distort the
results. It concluded, however, that this could easily be cured by
use of a two-way mirror or microphone, through which the repre-
sentative could monitor the exam. 63 The right to union represen-
tation at polygraph exams also inures to private sector
employees.1'
The additional safeguard of representation should be provided
by statute to protect employees who are not presently protected
under case decision. This will ensure that the previously discussed
protections are adhered to scrupulously.
VIII. PENALTIES
As a final measure to ensure employer compliance with the oper-
ative provisions of protective legislation, the statute proposed must
include an effective penalty provision. For example, many states
provide criminal penalties for violations.'65 Other states go further
and provide criminal liability, tort liability and attorney's fees. 66
The Michigan statute provides for an amount equal to twice the
lost wages as damages when a tort action is brought. 67 It must be
remembered when dealing with large corporations that a small civil
fine would hardly serve as a deterrent to those practices.1 68
IX. CONSTITUTIONALITY
To date, constitutional attacks on polygraph prohibitions have
been unsuccessful. 69 Arguments asserted by plaintiffs seeking to
attack such legislation have included: 1) violation of due process
and equal protection in that the employer is unable to protect his
property, because requiring the employee to take a polygraph is
162. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Clearwater, No. CA-82-043 (Nov. 1, 1982).
163. Id. at 4-5.
164. Craver, supra note 59, at 31 n.135.
165. See, e.g., statutes of Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Montana,
New Jersey, and Washington, supra note 6.
166. Michigan, Minnesota, District of Columbia.
167. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 37.207(3) (1983).
168. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 149, § 19B (West 1973) (fine of not more than
$200), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.1-2 (1956) (fine of not more than $200).
169. State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1981); State v. Community
Distribs., 317 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1974); Nothdurft v. Ross, 445 N.Y.S.2d 222 (App. Div. 1981).
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forbidden,'170 2) violation of due process and equal protection in
that plaintiff's business (administering polygraph tests) was ad-
versely affected by such a statute,'' 3) unconstitutional over-
breadth,172 4) unconstitutional vagueness. 73
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statute regulated
commercial speech and was, therefore, reviewable under the four-
part test of Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission.17 4 After determining that the speech was not
protected under the commercial speech analysis, the court ad-
dressed the vagueness issue. The vagueness controversy centered
around the following phrase: "polygraph, voice stress analysis, or
any test purporting to test the honesty of any employee."'175 The
court found it necessary to construe this phrase as including any
test which measures physiological changes in the subject tested,
thus excluding written psychological questionnaires.7 6 Thus con-
strued, the court upheld the constitutional validity of the
statute. 7
7
X. CONCLUSION
Sparked by the Farmer decision, the 1983 session of the Florida
Legislature was presented a bill that would have provided a well-
drafted, comprehensive solution to the issues discussed in this
note. 178 However, the bill did not progress beyond committee.
Under the proposed legislation, employers, their agents, and em-
ployment agencies would have been prohibited from requesting or
requiring employees and prospective employees to submit to a pol-
170. State v. Community Distribs., 317 A.2d 697, 700 (N.J. 1974).
171. State v. Century Camera, v. 309 N.W.2d 735, 745 (Minn. 1981); Nothdurft v. Ross,
445 N.Y.S.2d 222 (App. Div. 1981).
172. Century Camera, 309 N.W.2d at 738.
173. Id. at 744-45.
174. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
For commercial speech to come within (the protection of the first amendment), it
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.
Century Camera, 309 N.W.2d at 742.
175. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 745-46.
178. Fla. HB 805 (1983).
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ygraph examination.' 7 ' The bill was made expressly applicable to
public and private sector employees, and included a pervasive
description of prohibited deception detection devices. 80 Further,
the penalty provisions included criminal and civil liability (double
damages for lost wages), and a provision entitling the plaintiff to
reasonable attorney's fees. 8 '
Since the bill did not exempt any particular class of employee
(for example police officers) it was a more than satisfactory solu-
tion to the major considerations discussed in this note. Should the
1984 legislature consider the bill again, however, and elect to adopt
the majority rule excepting police officers from its protective provi-
sions, it is urged that the drafters give serious consideration to the
suggested safeguards. If careful consideration renders it advisable,
such an exception may be defensible. However, a blanket exception
that is not carefully tailored to meet the policies that warrant its
inception would be without practical or moral justification. 8
VINCENT G. TORPY, JR.
179. Id. at § 3.
180. The prohibition is equally as pervasive as that provided by ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 7166 (Supp. 1982-83); see supra note 134.
181. Fla. HB 805, § 4 (1983).
182. In addition, the bill includes two features which are particularly noteworthy. First,
the bill would prohibit employers from obtaining a waiver from employees of their rights
under the statute. Id. at § (3)(c). While this provision might not be necessary (see State v.
Berkey Photo, Inc. 374 A.2d 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977)), it provides assurance
that the statute will not be circumvented by savvy employers. See also Minnesota and Wis-
consin statutes, supra note 6. Second, the Florida bill would prohibit the request to take the
polygraph not only as a condition of employment, but also as a condition of promotion or
change in status. This avoids the possibility of unfavorable interpretations of the phrase
"conditions of employment." Id. at § 3.
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